was the only country in the region where, by 1949, rice production was well above prewar peaks, although the Philippines had just managed to return to prewar output levels in that year (Table 9 .1).
Paauw has argued that, by 1950, both the Philippines, with the help of American assistance, and Thailand had returned to prewar output levels in terms of per capita GDP (1963: table 6 ). The estimates made by Manarungsan confi rm that, by 1950, real gross domestic product was around one-third higher than in 1938 (1989: 251) ; in per capita terms it was roughly the same. In the Philippines, total national product was estimated by Goodstein to have been around 11 percent higher in 1948 than in 1938, although per capita national product was signifi cantly lower (1962: table 1-1). But the Philippines experienced rapid growth of per capita gross national product after 1946; in the decade from 1946 to 1956, it more than doubled, which was almost certainly a faster rate of recovery than in any other part of Asia. Per capita consumption expenditures also doubled, indicating a signifi cant improvement in living standards (National Economic and Development Authority 1978: table 4.1.1). By 1956, total national product was thought to have been around 84 percent higher than in 1938; per capita output was also much higher than in 1938 in spite of rapid population growth after 1945 (Goodstein 1962) .
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the process of postwar rehabilitation was much slower; indeed, the evidence indicates that by 1959 neither Burma nor Indonesia, nor South Vietnam, nor British Malaya had returned to prewar levels of per capita GDP (van der Eng 2002: 172; Booth 2003a: table 2; Bassino unpublished). In the case of Burma, per capita GDP growth was quite rapid during the 1950s; the slow return to prewar levels was a consequence of the devastation of the 1940s. In Indonesia and South Vietnam, slow growth in per capita GDP in the 1950s, especially the latter part of the decade, also contributed to the slow recovery to prewar output levels (Table 9 .2). Maddison's (Maddison 2003: 183-185) . Taiwan, having experienced considerable destruction through bombing in the fi nal phase of the Pacifi c War, also struggled to regain pre-1942 levels of output after the end of the Japanese colonial era. By April 1946, the last Japanese soldier had left Taiwan, and the American Liaison Group also withdrew. The reins of government were handed over to the mainland Chinese KMT regime, who installed General Chen Yi as high commissioner. The result was three years of administrative misrule that severely hindered economic recovery (Kerr 1966: 97-142; Lin 1973: 27-33) . Infl ation had already taken hold in the fi nal phase of the Japanese era and was fueled after 1946 by large government defi cits. According to Kerr, word quickly spread on the mainland that substantial Japanese assets were available for the taking, and thousands of carpetbaggers streamed in, mainly from Shanghai (1966: 97-98) . The newcomers had money or could arrange to get it from mainland banks, and working together with the new government, they rapidly acquired many Japanese and joint Japanese-Taiwanese enterprises.
The takeover of Japanese property was done in the name of "Necessary State Socialism," but the corruption and mismanagement was so blatant that it caused immense resentment among many Taiwanese. The presence of thousands of poorly paid and equipped mainland troops also contributed to the looting of property owned by indigenous Taiwanese as well as by the departing Japanese. Food stockpiled by the Japanese army was immediately confi scated, but in addition, many Taiwanese farmers had to give rice and other produce to the government, precipitating food shortages in what had always Table 9 .2. Index of Per Capita GDP, 1950 -1970 (1960 = 100) 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 Singapore n.a. been a food-surplus island. Mounting infl ation also contributed to the woes of urban people who could no longer afford to buy food and other necessities. By 1947, popular resentment had boiled over into armed revolt, which was brutally suppressed. Many educated Taiwanese, who had been the most vocal critics of Chen Yi's misrule, lost their lives. The fi nal defeat of the KMT on the mainland and the advent of around 1.5 million mainlanders in 1949 did bring some benefi ts to Taiwan. Many skilled professionals, managers, and administrators arrived who were able to fi ll at least some of the gaps left by the departing Japanese. Some brought both capital and technical expertise in manufacturing industry. The KMT government was able to impose a monetary reform, which did fi nally bring down the rate of infl ation. Massive American aid permitted the imports of key commodities including soybean, cotton, and fertilizers (Lin 1973: 33-38) . Aid and improvements in tax collection reduced the government defi cit. Steps were also taken to improve the lot of rural Taiwanese. The Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction was set up and began to tackle the problems in the rural economy, although the terms of trade facing farmers continued to deteriorate until 1954 (ibid.: 206) . Greater availability of fertilizer boosted rice production, although prewar production levels were not regained until the early 1950s (see Table 9 .1). Sugar production had not regained prewar levels by 1960; the loss of protected markets in Japan was a blow from which the industry never fully recovered.
By 1953, real per capita income in Taiwan had returned to the prewar peak, in spite of the 60 percent increase in population (Hsing 1971: 152) . From 1953 onward, growth in Taiwan was new, rather than simply catching up to prewar levels. Aid infl ows played an important role in the rapid recovery and continued growth of the Taiwanese economy between 1946 and 1961; during these years per capita US aid fl ows were higher than in any other country in the region (Table 9. 3). According to Hsing, the Americans, in disbursing project aid, favored infrastructure projects such as electric power and transport Table 9 .3. American Aid Per Capita, 1946 Capita, -1948 Capita, , 1949 Capita, -1952 Capita, , and 1953 Capita, -1961 (US dollars, annual averages over the years shown) 1946 -1948 1949 -1952 1953 -1961 1971: 192-198) ; in the fi rst part of the 1950s, aid funds covered half of total gross capital formation. But some part of the aid did go to the agricultural sector and especially to the implementation of the land reform program, which is examined more fully below. In Korea, the post-1945 problems were more serious than in Taiwan and took longer to resolve. The end of Japanese rule and the division of the country "created extreme disorganization in every aspect of Korean society" (Kim and Roemer 1979: 25) . The departure of almost all Japanese managers and technicians led to a sharp fall in manufacturing output; many plants had to suspend production completely because of a lack of raw materials and managerial staff. Kim and Roemer have estimated that industrial output in the south in 1948 was only about 15 percent of the 1939 level (ibid.: 27). The southern sector experienced a surge in population, due to refugees from the north and also to the repatriation of migrant workers from Japan and other parts of the former Japanese empire. Food availability per capita declined sharply, and South Korea became dependent on food aid from the United States.
The division of the Korean peninsula together with the communist victories in China created a highly unstable political situation. In 1950, troops from the north crossed the line of partition and tried to set up a unifi ed state. Seoul, the capital of the southern zone, fell to the invading army. The bitter war that followed involved large numbers of foreign troops from the United States and its allies and from China and the Soviet Union. The fi ghting was brought to an end after three years with an armistice agreement in 1953 that effectively returned the country to the pre-1950 status quo. The war caused massive devastation of private dwellings, industrial plants, and infrastructure. In addition, many people were forced to move from their ancestral homes, and at least 2 million Koreans from both north and south, many of them civilians, perished. It was estimated that real output of agriculture, forestry, mining, and manufacturing in South Korea was only 73 percent of 1940 levels in 1953; in per capita terms, commodity output had fallen by almost half (Kim and Roemer 1979: 35) . Such was the fall in productive capacity that "the Korean economy in 1953 could be managed only with a massive infl ow of foreign relief and aid" (ibid.: 39).
By the late 1950s, it was clear that, within Southeast Asia, Thailand and the Philippines were undergoing structural change away from agriculture and toward industry (Paauw 1963: 575-577) . In Taiwan also, the share of agriculture in GDP was falling and that of industry increasing (Hsing 1971: 274) . By 1960, the percentage of GDP accruing from agriculture in the former colonies varied considerably; it was still more than 50 percent in Indonesia and Cambodia but below 30 percent in Burma, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Singapore (Table 9 .4). But a fall in the percentage accruing from agriculture did not necessarily mean that there was an increase in the share of manufacturing industry. In a number of countries, the share of the tertiary sector, including government services, had increased rapidly after 1950. In many former colonies, agriculture and manufacturing industry together accounted for only around half of total GDP (Table 9 .4).
In 1960, in spite of a sluggish growth performance since 1945, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya had the highest per capita GDP among the former colonial territories, with Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea behind them (Table 9 .5). Indonesia and Burma were well behind South Korea. These two economies remained behind throughout the 1960s. Several observers attributed their poor performance to a failure to relink effectively to the world economy; this argument is examined further below. There was Table 9 .5. Per Capita GDP (1985 US dollars), 1955 , 1960 , 1965 , 1970 1955 1960 1965 1970 Tables 9.2 and 9 .4). The Philippines, by contrast, experienced much more modest per capita growth during the 1960s, and the share of manufacturing industry in total output fell slightly. A further aspect of structural change in Southeast Asia that might help to explain the divergent outcomes after 1960 concerns the role of government. Most of the newly independent countries in Southeast Asia, even the more pro-Western ones, such as the Philippines and Thailand, were inclined toward a more activist view of the state than the colonial powers had been. This involved not just higher levels of public expenditures relative to GDP, but also direct government involvement in production through state-owned enterprises. Planning offi ces were established throughout the region, and a variety of development plans were produced. To quote a United Nations publication: "The actual extent of planning has varied from country to country. Mainland China and other centrally planned economies of the region have attempted to implement plans affecting their entire economies. In other countries the plans deal only or mainly with the major programmes to be implemented in the public sector and, in several of them, lay down production and investment targets for the private sector" (United Nations ECAFE 1961: 54) .
If one of the purposes of the increased emphasis on the role of government in the economy was to bring about an increase in the share of government domestic revenues and expenditures, and especially government investment expenditures, relative to GDP, outcomes by the latter part of the 1950s in different parts of Asia were very mixed. Comparing government revenues and expenditures per capita in the 1950s with those in the 1930s is difficult because exchange rates were overvalued in many parts of Asia after 1950, which makes conversion into dollars problematic. But there is ample evidence that, compared with the colonial regimes, several newly independent countries found domestic revenue mobilization diffi cult. The rapid increase in world prices for a range of agricultural and mineral products that occurred in the early 1950s as a result of the Korean War led to a windfall increase in government revenues in primary exporting countries, as taxes on foreign trade still accounted for a large proportion of all taxes. But the war boom collapsed rapidly, and in most parts of Southeast Asia, government revenues were less than 15 percent of GDP by 1957 (Table 9.6).
Government expenditures were higher than domestic revenues in most of the former colonies, which refl ected the important role of foreign aid, especially in the case of Taiwan and South Korea. It was in these two economies together with Burma that government investment accounted for around 9 percent of GDP in 1957. Elsewhere government investment was below 5 percent of GDP (see Table 9 .6). Much of this investment went toward the repair and rebuilding of war-damaged infrastructure; very few of the former colonies in East and Southeast Asia had been able, by the end of the 1950s, to add substantially to the stock of infrastructure that had been in place by the late 1930s. The evidence on installed capacity of electric power illustrates this point. By 1959, there was wide variation in installed capacity per capita, with Singapore and Taiwan at the top of the rankings (Table 9 .7). In Taiwan, the fi gure was about 50 percent higher than the prewar fi gure, and there was an even more rapid increase in the Philippines, albeit from a lower base. But elsewhere there was little change (see Table 4 .7). In South Korea, installed capacity was, in 1959, well below the fi gure for the whole of Korea in the late 1930s, refl ecting both the damage infl icted during the Korean War and the fact that much of the capacity installed in the Japanese era was in the north of the country.
It would be simplistic to argue that the relatively high ratios of government investment to GDP in the latter part of the 1950s were in themselves a crucial determinant of future economic growth. Taiwan, South Korea, and Burma all managed quite high ratios in spite of the fact that around 30 percent of government expenditures in all these economies was devoted to defense. But after 1960, Taiwan and South Korea forged ahead in terms of economic growth, while Burma fell behind. To seek the explanation for this, we have to look in more detail at the way in which these economies responded to the changing opportunities for international trade in the post-1950 world econ- omy. We also have to take into account the changes in political leadership that occurred during the 1960s.
Inward-and Outward-Looking Economic Policies
In a well-known paper written in the mid-1960s, the Burmese economist Hla Myint drew a distinction between what he termed the "inward-" and "outward-" looking economies of Southeast Asia. He argued that, by the early 1960s, two discernible patterns of economic development had emerged in South east Asia, typifi ed by Burma and Indonesia, on the one hand, and Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, on the other. (He did not explicitly consider the countries of former Indochina, and he did not examine Taiwan and South Korea). Myint pointed out that while all the countries of Southeast Asia shared a common reaction after independence to what might be termed the "colonial economic pattern," the nature of the reaction differed between these two groups. Governments in the Philippines, Thailand, and (British) Malaya seemed to have sensed early that it would be easier and quicker to change the economic structure and the pattern of distribution of incomes and economic activities if the total volume of national output were expanding rapidly than in a situation of economic stagnation or slow growth. They also seemed to have realised that, given the basic conditions of their economies, the key to expanding their total national product was to be found in expanding the volume of their exports. Since a large share of these exports was produced by the foreign-owned mines and plantations, the governments of these countries took care to guarantee the security of foreign property and freedom to remit profi ts, and generally created a favorable economic environment which encouraged the foreign enterprises not only to continue their existing production but also to undertake new investments, to strike out into new lines of exports and to introduce new methods of production and organization. (Myint 1967: 2-3) In contrast, Myint continued, the political leaderships of Burma and Indonesia at that time "were obsessed by the fear" that once foreign enterprises were allowed to reestablish themselves or expand their operations, they would resume their old stranglehold over the economy and reimpose the colonial economic pattern whereby most profi ts were remitted abroad, and the local populations gained little benefi t from the exploitation of the economy's abundant natural resources. Myint argued that both countries did little to attract new investment and indeed nationalized many foreign-owned fi rms. In the latter part of the 1950s, after the failure in the United Nations of a resolution on Indonesian sovereignty over West New Guinea, the Indonesian government proceeded to nationalize all remaining Dutch-owned enterprises in Indonesia and expel almost all their staff (Anspach 1969: 191-192) . The Dutch enterprises were, for the most part, converted into state-owned enterprises and have remained in government hands down to the present day. Lacking skilled administrators to run such a wide diversity of companies, including estates, banks, trading houses, and industrial enterprises, many were turned over to the military or to nominees of political parties, often with unfortunate consequences for their management.
Both the Indonesian and Burmese governments also adopted policies hostile to their Chinese and Indian minorities, so that many left either for their ancestral homelands or to settle in third countries. But in spite of much rhetoric supporting "indigenism," policies toward indigenous producers, especially of exports, were also often hostile. In both countries, smallholder producers of export crops were taxed through export taxes and marketing boards, and there was little investment in infrastructure or new cultivation technologies that would directly benefi t smallholder producers. The increasingly overvalued exchange rates led to greatly increased smuggling of traded goods in the border regions of Burma, while in Indonesia, many of the export-producing regions outside Java virtually seceded from the national economy and were conducting their own export and import trade with neighboring Malaysia and with the Philippines.
Even among the countries that Myint considered were pursuing "opentype" policies after 1950s, there were considerable differences in both policies and outcomes in the two decades from 1950 to 1970. In their study of the transition in the open dualistic economies of East and Southeast Asia, Paauw and Fei distinguished between those countries characterized by neocolonialism (Malaya and Thailand) and those characterized by economic national-ism (Taiwan and the Philippines) (1973: 77-89) . The neocolonial countries continue to rely on free market systems to facilitate the growth of traditional export staples, while the nationalists use controls to facilitate import substitution, leading to the rapid growth of domestic industrial capacity to replace imported goods. Broadly, the neocolonial path was adopted by both Thailand and Malaya because both countries were still, after 1950, characterized by favorable natural resource endowments. In addition, a lack of entrepreneurship and capital among the indigenous population coupled with distrust of the migrant minorities on the part of the political elite militated against the adoption of policies favoring rapid domestic industrialization. In Thailand, state enterprises were the favored vehicle for industrialization until the Sarit regime assumed power in 1957. Thereafter, the government embarked on an import-substitution strategy, with substantial foreign participation, usually through joint ventures with Sino-Thai business groups.
In both the Philippines and Taiwan, alien minorities played a much smaller role in the nonagricultural sectors of the economy, and industrial interests had more political power from the early 1950s onward. But the transition process in these two countries, although broadly within the economic nationalist mold, differed in important respects. In Taiwan, the import-substituting phase was remarkably short; already by the early 1960s agricultural exports accounted for less than 50 percent of all exports (Paauw and Fei 1973: 273) . The speed of the transition was in large part due to the supply of entrepreneurs, many of whom had come from the mainland. To begin with, manufactured exports from Taiwan were concentrated in labor-intensive products such as textiles, garments, and footwear. Increasingly after 1960, more technologically sophisticated industrial processes were mastered, and manufactured exports became far more diversifi ed into products that Taiwan had not produced at all, or only in very small quantities, during the import-substitution phase (Nelson and Pack 1999: 418-419) .
Apart from the supply of entrepreneurial talent and capital, Paauw and Fei also stressed the crucial role of agricultural modernization in the transition to export-oriented growth (1973: 114-115) . They argued that government policies, including land reform, agricultural cooperatives, extension services, and infrastructure investment played an important role in modernizing Taiwanese agriculture, in addition to private initiatives. During the 1950s, Taiwan was able to build on the Japanese legacy in the agricultural sector, and the rapid gains in agricultural productivity facilitated the release of labor into nonagricultural employment. To the extent that this was rural-based, industrialization took place without rapid urbanization, and many rural households were able to diversify their incomes away from total reliance on agriculture without physically relocating to the towns. There is considerable evidence that, since the 1950s, farm households in Taiwan earned their income increasingly from off-farm and nonagricultural sources (Ho 1986: table 4.2) .
The transition to export-oriented growth in Taiwan was accompanied by a change in the balance of trade; whereas in the colonial era there had been a large export surplus, throughout the 1950s, imports exceeded exports, often by a large margin (Table 9 .8). In the Philippines as well, the balance of trade was negative for most years from 1949 onward (Power and Sicat 1971: 37) . Perhaps paradoxically, it was in Burma and Indonesia, the two Southeast Asian economies that had run large current account surpluses in the prewar era, that the balance of trade remained in surplus throughout much of the 1950s (Table  9 .8). Although there were large defi cits in services in both economies, especially Indonesia, during most of the 1950s, the current account was in surplus (Rosendale 1978: 146) . The reasons for these surpluses are not entirely clear; in the early 1950s, they were the result of the rapid surge in export prices as a result of the Korean War boom. Later in the decade, slow overall economic growth together with import controls and a complex multiple exchange rate system appear to have depressed import demand.
In most of the former colonies in East and Southeast Asia, the share of the former metropolitan powers in total exports and imports fell after 1950 (Table 9 .9). This refl ected a trend toward diversifi cation of trade fl ows that was common to almost all former colonies in the postindependence period (Kleiman 1976: 478) . In those colonies where trade fl ows before 1940 had been very tightly tethered to the metropolitan power, the decline was quite marked; in Taiwan, for example, Japan's share of total exports fell from more than 90 percent in 1938 to less than 40 percent by 1960. There was a similar fall in the share of imports coming from Japan. By 1960, Taiwan was sourcing more imports from the United States, which was in part at least a refl ection of the large American aid fl ows (Table 9 .9). In the Philippines, the share of the United States in total exports fell, while that of Japan rose, although the United States remained the country's most important trading partner. In Indonesia, where the Netherlands only accounted for around 20 percent of export and import trade in 1938, the proportion had fallen to virtually nothing by 1960, refl ecting the hostile nature of the bilateral relationship after the expropriation of Dutch assets in 1958-1959. The transition to rapid export-oriented growth in Taiwan in the 1960s has often been compared with that in South Korea. Certainly the experience of both these economies had become an important model for other developing countries, in Asia and elsewhere, by the 1980s, although there were important differences in the policies they adopted (Wade 1990: 320-325) . In the 1950s, South Korea followed a "one-sided policy of import substitution" with export growth playing a minimal role in overall economic growth. In the 1960s, trade and exchange rate policies were reformed, and there was a rapid switch to export-oriented growth, leading some commentators to talk of an "unbalanced export-oriented industrialization strategy" (Kim and Roemer 1979: 136-137) . By 1970, manufacturing output was a slightly lower proportion of GDP in South Korea than in Taiwan, although higher than in any Southeast Asian country except Singapore, where per capita GDP was much higher and the agricultural sector tiny (see Table 9 .4). Like Taiwan, South Korea after 1960 was extremely successful in increasing exports in sectors that had not developed at all during the colonial and immediate postcolonial years.
Reforming Land Tenure and Promoting Agricultural Growth
In the aftermath of depression, war, and foreign occupations, the problem of land tenure was of paramount importance in the minds of many of the nationalists who came to power in the decade after the Japanese defeat. Even more than in the late 1930s, all the colonial territories in East and Southeast Asia were still basically agricultural economies in 1945, with the majority of their labor forces relying on agriculture for most of their income. Yet there was a widespread conviction that many of those employed in agriculture were somehow being cheated of their just rewards, and in some parts of Asia, this conviction was already spilling over into armed insurrections. The grievances centered on three key issues: tenancy, large estates, and growing landlessness. It was already obvious by the late 1930s that tenancy was widespread in both Taiwan and Korea as well as in Lower Burma and the Philippines (see Table  3 .5). But the causes were very different in different colonies. In Burma, tenancy was the result of dispossession of indigenous cultivators by Indian moneylenders, while in Korea it was due to widespread ownership of land by both indigenous and Japanese landlords. In Taiwan and the Philippines as well as in southern Vietnam, indigenous landlords predominated. Large estates run along capitalist lines, employing substantial numbers of wage workers and often owned by foreign interests, were important in the development of export crops in British Malaya, Indonesia, South Vietnam, and the Philippines. Increasingly after 1945, they were the focus of intense resentment from various nationalist and radical forces, for whom they exemplifi ed exploitation on the part of either foreign corporations or domestic "comprador capitalists." But should these estates be nationalized and run by domestic corporations, either state-owned or private? Or should they be divided up among smallholder farmers? The case for converting estates into smallholdings was especially strong in regions where population growth was outstripping available supplies of arable land and where landlessness and near landlessness was an increasing problem. They included Java, parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi, and parts of the Philippines and Vietnam. Even in those regions considered land abundant in the pre-1940 era, landlessness was growing, and confl icts over land were increasingly violent after 1945. In North Sumatra, where the postwar migration of Bataks from their traditional homelands added to existing population pressures, demands for the redistribution of estate lands were becoming more pressing, while in the central plains of Thailand, both tenancy and the numbers of landless were increasing (Feith 1962: 293-297; Phongpaichit and Baker 1995: 38-39) .
Newly independent or about to become independent governments in East and Southeast Asia reacted to these demands for agrarian reform in different ways. Perhaps the most successful, and certainly the most quoted, example of agrarian reform was that carried out in Taiwan between 1949 and 1953. In 1949, the KMT government enacted a rent reduction program that aimed to reduce rents and increase the security of tenants. This program was followed by the sale of part of the public lands owned by the Japanese state until 1945 to Taiwanese cultivators who had been leasing the land. Then in 1953, the "Land to the Tiller" program was implemented; this consisted of the compulsory purchase of tenanted farm land and its resale to those who were actually cultivating the land (Apthorpe 1979: 521-522) . The result of these policies was that, by 1955, more than 80 percent of farmers in Taiwan were either full or part owner-operators, while only 17 percent were pure tenants, compared with 41 percent in 1945 (Mao 1982: table 1).
A number of extravagant claims have been made about the impact of the Taiwanese reform program; a not untypical claim is that it "created the foundation for both economic growth and an equitable distribution of income and wealth" (Orme 1995: 41) . In fact, the reform did not have a dramatic impact on the size distribution of operated holdings, which was already quite equal in the Japanese era (Apthorpe 1979: 529) . Nor is it clear what the contribution of the reform policies was to subsequent agricultural growth in Taiwan, as a number of other important development programs in the agricultural sector were also being implemented at the same time. Thus it is probably wrong to argue that agrarian reform by itself had a dramatic impact on output per hectare or per worker, both of which increased steadily during the 1950s and 1960s (Lee and Chen 1979: table T-1a). However, the granting of secure title to cultivators undoubtedly did, at the margin, encourage greater use of inputs such as fertilizer and improved seeds and increased the net wealth of many rural families.
In Korea after 1945, the implementation of land reform proceeded rather differently than in either Japan or Taiwan. In the north, a fi ve-hectare limit was placed on holding size, which "did away with perennially high rates of tenancy" (Cumings 1997: 428) . It would not have made much difference to operated holding sizes, as by the late 1930s very few operated holdings exceeded fi ve hectares (see Table 3 .4). But the cultivators received secure title to land that they could pass on to their children, although the land was "socialized" in the sense that it could not be sold on the market. In the south, the government of President Rhee was not supportive of radical reform, and Rhee vetoed the Land Reform Act of 1949, although this veto was subsequently voted down by the legislative assembly. After the act was passed, implementation was slow, and it was only after the reoccupation of the south by Allied troops that the reform was concluded. Around 970,000 tenant farmers and farm laborers became landowners, and only about 7 percent of farmers were still tenants. The old landlord class was wiped out; although they were compensated with government bonds, for most the value was too low for them to make productive investments in nonagricultural ventures (Boyer and Ahn 1991: 31; Putzel 1992: 81-82) .
The Korean reform was a tenancy reform rather than a redistributive land reform (Lee 1979: 494) . It had little impact on the size distribution of operated holdings, although as in Taiwan, by conferring much greater security of tenure on cultivators, the reform would have had a positive impact on investment decisions. Efforts by the government in the south to modernize agriculture during the 1950s and 1960s do not appear to have been as successful as in Taiwan, and urban-rural income differentials remained large. These had the effect of encouraging out-migration, and many farm households rented out land that they could not cultivate themselves because the young adults in the household were working outside agriculture. By the end of the 1970s, tenancy was again increasing, although it was still illegal under the terms of the land reform legislation (Boyer and Ahn 1991: 77-79) .
There are obvious parallels between the situation in Vietnam and that in Korea after 1950; both countries were divided between communist and noncommunist regimes, and in both the noncommunist governments were dependent on American assistance and advice. In North Vietnam, a land reform program began in 1953 but rapidly led to "major upheavals in rural society," substantial opposition in many areas, and in 1956 the resignation of the fi rst secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (Fforde 1989: 11) .
Pre-1953 land reform efforts in the north carried out by Vietminh cadres had often been quite successful, as they were based on traditional views of the commune's obligation to redistribute land to those in need. But after 1954 the party's approach to land reform became more doctrinaire and coercive, and less popular with rural people. After 1959, rural cooperatives were formed, and by the early 1960s, more than 90 percent of the rural population in the north had joined cooperatives comprising around 70 percent of the cultivated area (ibid.: 12). How well or badly these functioned is still a matter of some controversy, but with the escalation of the war in the mid-1960s and heavy American bombing, the conditions for implementing sustained rural development policies were hardly propitious.
Matters were rather different in the south. As we have seen, population densities in Cochinchina were much lower than in Tonkin in the late 1930s, although tenancy was widespread (see Table 3 .1). After the installation of President Diem in 1956, the Americans pressed him to implement some tenure reforms, and Edward Lansdale, the American who had advised President Magsaysay on land reforms in the Philippines, was brought in to encourage Diem to take a more activist approach (Putzel 1992: 100 ). An ordinance enacted in 1955 was mainly concerned with confi rming the titles of absentee landlords, although it did provide for a maximum rental and for rent reductions in times of crop failure. Many farmers in those parts of the south effectively under Viet Cong control had been paying no rent to absentee landlords at all and were not impressed with the provisions of the ordinance. After further pressure from the Americans, another ordinance was issued that did allow for some redistribution from landlords to tenants, although the ceilings were about thirty times higher than the American advisers wanted (Wiegersma 1988: 181-184) . The main problem was that Diem relied on the landlord class and landowning offi cials for his support. Gradually, those in his government who were genuinely committed to rural reform were marginalized, and by the early 1960s, what little commitment there had been to effective reform had vanished.
In the Philippines, the average holding size was larger than in either Taiwan or Korea in the late 1930s, and around half the land was in holdings under full or partial tenancy (see Table 3 .5). Given the continuing infl uence of the Americans in the country after 1945, it might have been expected that they would push for land reform there as they were doing in both occupied Japan and the former Japanese colonies. But General MacArthur, after his reconquest of the Philippines in 1944, was determined to restore the pre-1942 status quo and did not want to threaten the landlord class that underpinned it (Putzel 1992: 83) . The Bell Trade Act, signed in 1945, provided for the resumption of free trade with the United States, thus restoring the power and privileges of the large sugar growers. The fi rst two post-1946 presidents, Roxas and Quirino, were conservatives who thought that the radical peasant movements that had arisen before and during the Japanese occupation could, and should, be destroyed by armed force. They had little time for arguments that land issues were at the heart of the rural unrest and must be addressed directly.
Land reform was placed on the policy agenda in 1950, with the publication of the report of the Bell Mission's survey of the Philippine economy (Putzel 1992: 85) . This report recommended substantial land redistribution as a means of ending the agrarian unrest. Experts who had worked on the Japanese land reform were dispatched to Manila; they argued for the abolition of absentee ownership, capping of rentals at 25 percent of the crop value, low ceilings on land retained by former landlords, and government purchase of land for resale to tenants and the landless. As in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, it was proposed that landlords be compensated with government bonds. Tenants would pay for land they acquired over a period of twenty-fi ve years, at an interest rate of 4 percent. The American advisers argued that implementation of these proposals would give cultivators the incentive to adopt new technologies, while at the same time encouraging former landlords to invest their capital in nonagricultural enterprises.
Putzel has argued that the American advisers "underestimated the degree to which the state was controlled by the landed oligarchy in the Philippines, and the extent of animosity toward reform among policy-makers and US corporate lobbyists in Washington" (1992: 87). When Ramon Magsaysay was elected to the presidency in 1953, it was hoped that he would be more supportive of agrarian reform; he did not come himself from a landowning background, and his political style was more populist than that of his predecessors. But he was both unwilling and unable to overcome the hostility of landowning interests; the agrarian legislation passed in 1954 and 1955 was modest in its aims, being mainly concerned with regulating tenancy agreements. The Land Reform Act of 1955 was more ambitious and created a Land Tenure Administration that would acquire large tenanted rice and corn estates and resell them to tenants. But the provisions of the act were watered down in the congress, with some legislators stating that any redistribution was "communist-inspired" and land reform should be limited to resettlement on virgin lands (ibid.: 92). With the death of Magsaysay in a plane crash in 1957, land reform slipped off the policy agenda until the Marcos era.
In other parts of Southeast Asia, problems of land tenure were also of pressing concern to postcolonial governments. In Burma, not surprisingly given the extent of tenancy in the late 1930s, the government was concerned with eliminating Indian ownership and restoring national ownership of land. This was done not through a Taiwan-style reform but by nationalizing all agricultural land in 1948. However, implementation was slow and the consequences not always benefi cial to tenants; some tenants were evicted as a result of land nationalization and became landless laborers (Steinberg 1981: 126) . In addition, although nationalization made the state the landlord, it did not always eliminate insecurity of tenure on the part of small cultivators. The Revolutionary Council that came to power in 1962 was committed to improv-ing the conditions of peasant cultivators and in 1965 passed a tenancy law that in effect abolished all tenancy. Although this legislation seemed radical, its main thrust was "to break up the landowner-tenant relationship in order to create a new government-owner-cultivator relationship and, at the same time, to strengthen government control over farmers" (Than and Nishizawa 1990: 90-91) .
In Thailand, there was little overt government concern with land tenure issues in the 1950s and 1960s, in spite of the evidence that "the balance of advantage shifted in favor of the landlord" in many rice-growing areas in the delta, and exploitative tenancy agreements were often a step toward complete landlessness (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995: 38) . In British Malaya, by contrast, offi cials became more concerned about land tenure issues in the preparation for self-government. Harper has argued that the debates over political and constitutional reform in the immediate post-1945 years took place "against a backdrop of agrarian crisis and terror" (1999: 94). According to his analysis, the communist rebellion, called an "emergency" by the British, drew its support and sustenance from an array of rural problems. During the Japanese occupation, many of the forest reserves created by the British had been felled for food-crop, especially tapioca, cultivation. Japanese food-crop policies were aggravated by spontaneous migration of people into the interiors of the peninsula; this process had begun during the depression and continued through the war years. Many of these squatters were Chinese. By the late 1940s, the squatter problem was acute in several areas and prevented rubber plantations from expanding the area under higher-yielding varieties (ibid.: 99-100).
To the problems of squatters and illegal deforestation were added problems of widespread tenancy. The survey reported by Wilson found that tenancy was widespread in the rice-growing regions in the northern part of the peninsula and that "less than one half of the padi land of North Malaya is owned by the farmers who cultivate it" (1958: 63). Wilson also found evidence of very uneven distribution of land in the areas where detailed surveys were carried out. Wilson's fi ndings were confi rmed by the 1960 Agricultural Census, which found that only about one-third of all wet paddy land in peninsular Malaya was owner-cultivated (Hill 1967: 101) . A much higher proportion of land under rubber and coconut cultivation was owner-operated, although Hill has queried the accuracy of these fi ndings. He argued that the high degree of tenancy, especially in the paddy areas, was the result of historical forces dating from the nineteenth century, when Malay entrepreneurs had secured land grants from the sultans and brought in many families from Java, Sumatra, and southern Borneo to cultivate them. Their descendants continued as tenant cultivators, while the descendants of the original landlords, often minor members of the royal households or hajis, continued as landlords and often extended their landholdings. Hill stressed that the colonial land legislation, and especially the Malay Reservation Acts, would not have affected Malay landlords, as the legislation was only intended to prevent non-Malays from acquiring agricultural land (ibid.: 106).
Probably nowhere in Asia in the years after the Japanese occupation were land problems more complex and politically fraught than in Indonesia. At least in British Malaya, arable land was still in abundant supply relative to the numbers wishing to cultivate it, even if access to land was inequitable, and land legislation often favored expatriate corporations over locals, whether Malay or Chinese. The situation was very different in many parts of Indonesia. The Dutch had bequeathed to independent Indonesia two distinct legal systems, one based on Dutch law and one on traditional or adat law, as it had been interpreted by colonial legal scholars. Although Dutch colonial offi cials tried to preserve traditional legal systems, especially as they related to land matters, they also realized that, with growing commercialization of the indigenous economy, land was increasingly becoming a marketable commodity. By the 1920s, the offi cial records showed that there were over 400,000 land transactions per year in Java and Bali (Booth 1998: 300) . Perhaps surprisingly, writers such as Boeke did not accept this as evidence of the existence of a land market (1953: 131) , although quite a high proportion of these transactions were sales rather than legacies or gifts. The Dutch agrarian legislation of 1870 permitted the leasing of land to Dutch and other foreign corporations, although foreigners were not able to purchase agricultural land outright.
By 1940, large estates in Indonesia controlled about 2.9 million hectares of land in Indonesia, of which only about 1.2 million hectares were actually under cultivation. Outside Java, only about 40 percent of land controlled by estates was planted (see Table 3 .9). By contrast, many families in Java, Bali, and other parts of the country either possessed no land at all or cultivated only very small parcels, from which they could not make an adequate living. Some colonial agricultural experts, aware of the growing landlessness in Java and the widespread indigenous resentment about land issues, advocated the conversion of land under both annual and perennial crops to food-crop agriculture. This happened to some extent during the Japanese occupation and the ensuing struggle against the Dutch, with squatters occupying land that had been under both annual crops (tobacco and sugar) and tree crops (tea, coffee, and rubber).
In 1950, the government faced a very diffi cult problem regarding estate land. Under the terms of the Round Table Conference Agreements of 1949, the Indonesian negotiators had pledged to honor existing legal titles to land; in addition, the pressing need to earn foreign exchange and attract more foreign investment encouraged the new government to accommodate the demands of Dutch and other foreign-owned estate and mining companies (Feith 1962: 293) . But that meant expelling many thousands of squatters, most of whom had few other means of making a living. The scene was set for bitter and protracted struggles, which lasted throughout the period of parliamentary democracy. Perhaps surprisingly, given the populist inclinations of most of the post-1950 cabinets, government policy tended to protect the large estates. When in the late 1950s the government took over most Dutch-owned companies, including estates, they continued to be operated as estates, often managed by the military. The option of dividing up the land, amounting to well over 1 million hectares, among smallholder cultivators does not seem to have been seriously considered.
This failure is all the more surprising when we consider the position of the smallholder cultivator of cash crops in postindependence Indonesia. By the 1950s, smallholders were producing 88 percent of output of tobacco, 77 percent of coffee, and 65 percent of rubber (Booth 1988: table 6.5). Of the main export crops, only sugar and tea were still largely produced by estates, although output of both crops remained well below pre-1940 levels throughout the 1950s. While the failure to break up large estates in the Philippines or South Vietnam can be explained by the dominant position of large landowners in the government and the legislature, this was far less the case in Indonesia. The failure to redistribute estate land was in large part due to the urban bias of the principal decision makers; they simply did not appreciate that smallholder producers were potentially far more effi cient than the large estates. In addition, both military and civilian offi cials saw the estates as important sources of patronage in an increasingly diffi cult economic environment. As they were largely ignorant of the problems, both technical and socioeconomic, facing the estate sector, it is hardly surprising that most of the new managers had at best patchy success in reviving its fortunes.
In January 1960, the Supreme Advisory Council of President Sukarno held a special session devoted to land reform; after this the government moved quickly to introduce new agrarian legislation. Its intention was to unify the dualistic legacy from the Dutch colonial era and convert all land rights into a single system based on adat law but modifi ed by principles introduced in the new law (Gautama and Harsono 1973: 24) . The new legislation introduced both land ceilings (depending on the density of population) and minimum holding sizes (of two hectares). As Mortimer has pointed out, it was an arithmetical impossibility to provide two hectares to every rural family in Java, even if vacant estate land was redistributed, lower land ceilings than fi ve hectares imposed, and land grants to village offi cials abolished (1974: 287) . The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) did in fact advocate these more radical reforms, although it did not advocate the formation of agricultural collectives. "If the PKI leaders shared the Leninist view that land reform was no more than a necessary concession to the proprietary instincts of the peasantry along the way to collectivization, they did not show it" (ibid.: 288). Instead they supported a "land to the tiller" policy and supported the demands of squatters on former estate and forest land, small landowners who had lost their land through pawning, and landless laborers. Partly as a result of PKI agitation, some 1 million hectares of agricultural land had been redistributed to around 1 million people by 1968, although some of this might have been reoccupied subsequently by former owners (Utrecht 1969: 84) .
The modest achievements of land reform policies in most parts of Southeast Asia in the critical two decades following 1945 were thus the result of powerful vested interests in governments and legislatures who opposed radical redistribution, on the one hand, and an inability on the part of many urban-based nationalists, including those from left-wing parties, to appreciate the nature and extent of the problems in rural areas, on the other. A surprising number maintained the colonial belief that estates were a more effi cient form of agricultural production, in spite of the evidence to the contrary. In addition, in Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines, there was a tendency on the part of well-intentioned reformers to believe that problems of landlessness in densely settled regions could be solved by moving people to those parts of the country deemed to have abundant supplies of empty land. These attitudes can be contrasted with the situation in Taiwan, where land reform was implemented quickly and effi ciently by the KMT government, whose members had few vested interests to protect or few illusions that land settlement was a viable option.
The failure to implement land reform in the Philippines did not have an adverse impact on agricultural growth, which was in fact quite rapid in the 1950s and 1960s. Total output growth was 4 percent per annum during these two decades, which was slower than in South Korea and Taiwan but faster than in many other parts of Asia (David and Barker 1979: table 5.2). But growth in both output per hectare and output per worker in the agricultural sector was much slower in the Philippines than in the two former Japanese colonies (Table 9 .10). Much of the agricultural growth in the Philippines during these two decades was due to increases in land and labor rather than to growth in factor productivity. The slow growth in agricultural productivity combined with the skewed access to land and the large number of landless rural families, estimated by Bautista to be 20 percent of all rural households in 1965 (1994: 99) , meant that by the early 1960s poverty levels were still high in rural areas of the Philippines. The proportion of the population under the poverty line was estimated to be 64 percent in 1961; this had fallen only slightly to 57 percent by 1971 (Balisacan 1993: 297) . By the early 1970s, there were clear differences between the size distribution of landholdings in Taiwan and in most parts of Southeast Asia. In 1975, only 4 percent of land was in holdings over fi ve hectares in Taiwan compared with 34 percent in the Philippines, 23 percent in Indonesia, and 24 percent in Thailand (Booth 2002: table 2 ). Agricultural growth in Taiwan was accompanied by considerable diversifi cation of farm household income away from dependence on agricultural incomes. While this was also happening in other parts of Asia, the "linkage ratio" between growth in agricultural incomes and growth in other sources of income for agricultural households appeared to be considerably lower than in Taiwan (ibid.: table 4). The land reform program appeared to have brought about an egalitarian distribution of ownership of agricultural land, while the rapid growth of employment opportunities in nonagricultural activities meant that most rural households experienced growth in nonagricultural incomes at the same time that agricultural incomes were increasing. This benign outcome did not occur to anything like the same extent in other parts of Asia.
Eradicating the Legacy of the Plural Economy
It was stressed in the previous chapter that the Japanese occupation facilitated the rise of an aggressive form of indigenism in several parts of Southeast Asia. This was due in part to the expropriation of almost all enterprises owned by European and American interests and in part to the harsh treatment of many ethnic Chinese businesspeople. In addition, the Japanese approach to economic policy making in the occupied territories was dirigiste in the extreme and relied on a range of economic controls embracing most aspects of production and distribution. Even if this controlled economy proved incapable of supplying basic needs to the great majority of the population across Southeast Asia, it still presented nationalists across the region with an alternative model to the apparently more laissez-faire approach of the colonial powers (Golay, Anspach, Pfanner, and Ayal 1969: 455 -456) . In spite of the increasing economic dislocation in the last phase of the Japanese period, some shrewd and determined indigenous businesspeople in various parts of Southeast Asia were able to turn a chaotic situation to their own advantage and establish viable enterprises.
On the political front, the fi erce devotion to emperor, armed forces, and nation, which inspired the Japanese military, made a deep impression on many young people in Southeast Asia, and this intense nationalism inevitably affected the way they viewed economic problems. After 1945, the relationship between indigenous business groups, the Chinese, and foreign businesses, especially those originating from the colonial power, could never be the same as it was before 1942. The forces of indigenism were probably strongest in Indonesia, where grievances against both the Dutch and the Chinese were intense, and in Burma, where not just Indians and Chinese, but also some minority ethnic groups such as the Karens, were considered to have been accorded favorable treatment in the colonial era. But they were not entirely absent elsewhere in the former colonies or in Thailand, the only Southeast Asian country to have escaped direct colonial control.
In most of the former colonies in Southeast Asia, the independent governments wanted to eradicate what they saw as the pernicious legacy of the plural economy, with its apparent tight relationship between ethnicity and economic role. It has been suggested that the drive toward rapid indigenism was essentially an elite phenomenon, "originating with and promoted by politicians seeking power for other ends and by members of a narrow indigenous entrepreneurial element who are motivated by avarice to expropriate alien wealth" (Golay, Anspach, Pfanner, and Ayal 1969: 447) . While this was probably true, especially in Indonesia and Burma, it could hardly be denied that in both countries there was considerable grassroots antagonism against the role of the Chinese and the Indians respectively. In Burma, this antagonism was in large part due to the Indian expropriation of indigenous cultivators. In Indonesia, it resulted from the role of the Chinese in rural areas as traders and moneylenders together with the widespread perception among many nationalists that Chinese businesses had received preferential treatment under the Dutch. In 1956, the former minister of the interior in the Natsir cabinet, Assaat, made a direct attack on the role of the Chinese in Indonesia, which triggered a number of violent demonstrations against Chinese businesses; these attacks continued well into the 1960s (Feith 1962: 481-487; Mackie 1976) .
In both Burma and Indonesia, the decade after independence witnessed much political rhetoric about socialism and popular control over the means of production. In Burma, there was a strong government push during the 1950s, even before the military regime assumed power, to take over both British and Indian fi rms, and to establish new state enterprises in manufacturing. By 1960, it was estimated that more than 90 percent of industry was Burmeseowned. But it was clear that many private businesses and state enterprises were poorly managed and that government industrial policy suffered from a lack of coordination. The Revolutionary Government that assumed control in the early 1960s, after a brief period of apparent openness to both domestic and foreign private enterprise, abruptly reversed its policy and after 1963 prevented the establishment of any new private enterprise in manufacturing industry (Pfanner 1969: 231-232) .
The main problem facing governments in Burma and elsewhere who wished to promote both indigenous private enterprises and state enterprises was the acute shortage of managerial expertise. Few indigenous Indonesians, Thais, Burmese, Malays, Vietnamese, or even Filipinos had had much experience running large-scale productive enterprises, and many of the state corpo-rations created throughout Southeast Asia between 1945 and 1960 were fi nancial failures. In Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia, many managers were former army offi cers and treated the enterprises they were supposed to be running as sources of personal enrichment and patronage. Ayal has pointed out that, even before 1940, the Thai experience confi rmed the basic correlation between premature indigenism and corruption, a correlation that was to become more obvious in other parts of the region after 1950 (1969: 338 -339) .
In Indonesia, the 1945 constitution had enshrined the "family principle" of economic organization, and some nationalist leaders regarded cooperatives as an "excellent expression of Indonesian social ideals" even though the peasant economy in Indonesia had, during the latter part of the colonial era, been increasingly based on private ownership of land and production for the market, whether domestic or foreign (Mackie 1964: 44 -45) . Perhaps because the spirit of private enterprise was so strong in rural areas, little was achieved with agricultural cooperatives during the 1950s, and, as we have seen, there was little pressure for the establishment of collective farms, even on the part of the Indonesian Communist Party. Instead in the early 1950s, government policy was directed more to the fostering of indigenous entrepreneurs in the nonagricultural economy. The so-called Benteng program, established immediately after independence, was at fi rst directed mainly toward getting more indigenous Indonesians involved in the lucrative import and export trade, which had been dominated in colonial times by the big Dutch trading houses and to a lesser extent by the Chinese.
Anspach has discussed the failings of the program in detail. As he pointed out, there was concern, even among some nationalist politicians, at the blatant racial bias of the Benteng measures and the unwillingness to encourage Chinese businesses even when their owners had adopted Indonesian nationality (1969: 168-179) . In addition, the lingering support for cooperatives, especially strong with Vice President Hatta, meant that some key politicians tended to oppose any plan to encourage private enterprise, whatever the ownership. The distaste of the Hatta camp for hothouse development of indige nous entrepreneurs was no doubt strengthened by the growing evidence that many of the so-called indigenous businesses that got access to import licenses were simply fronts for more experienced Chinese companies. In fact, close cooperation between Chinese businessmen and Indonesian powerholders began during the latter part of the 1940s, when nationalists leaders established links with totok traders in order to secure food and other essential materials for the struggle against the Dutch (Twang 1998: 324 -327) . It was the less culturally integrated totok, rather than the older, established, Dutch-speaking peranakan business groups, who adjusted more quickly to the often hostile political climate of the 1950s.
President Sukarno exploited the growing public frustration at the perceived failure of indigenist policies after he brought the period of constitutional democracy to an end in 1958 and ushered in the Guided Economy. From then on, indigenist goals became intertwined with the aim of implement-ing Indonesian socialism, although as Anspach has pointed out, for most of the Indonesian political elite, socialism meant little more than "an emotional predilection, a vestigial sentiment from the revolutionary struggle against the capitalistic Dutch" (1969: 126) . In fact, the decades of the 1950s and the 1960s almost certainly witnessed an attenuation of the role of government in the Indonesian economy. Government expenditures relative to GDP were already low in Indonesia in comparison with several other former colonies in the late 1950s (see Table 9 .6). After 1960, in spite of the increased rhetoric about Indonesian socialism, revenues and expenditures fell further relative to GDP. In 1960, output from government enterprises, including those expropriated from the Dutch, amounted to only about 20 percent of total output (Booth 1998: fi gure 4.1, table 4.9).
In several respects, British Malaya in the late 1950s offered a stark contrast to the situation in both Burma and Indonesia as well as that in Thailand. The Chinese and to a lesser extent the Indian presence was much larger than elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and indigenous Malays comprised a much lower proportion of the nonagricultural labor force than in other colonies in the 1930s (see Tables 6.2 and 6.4). It might have been expected that indigenist policies would have been stronger there than in other parts of Southeast Asia. But according to Golay, Anspach, Pfanner, and Ayal, the forces of indigenism were comparatively weak, and there was little or no socialist content to such indigenist policies as were implemented (1969: 454) . Pressures on foreign and especially British enterprises were hardly draconian. Indeed White argued that, by 1957, the British had achieved something approximating neocolonialism or "informal empire " (1996: 269) .
The Alliance government maintained open economic policies, a competitive exchange rate, and a friendly attitude to foreign investment. In 1962, Malaya was the sixth largest recipient of direct foreign investment from Britain. Estate companies that had been established in the colonial era, far from being threatened with takeovers by the government, were encouraged to undertake replanting and expansion of their activities. Although Malaya's share of world rubber production, both natural and synthetic, was only 18.2 percent in 1960 compared with 44.5 percent during the 1930s, the Alliance government recognized that both rubber and tin would continue to be important earners of foreign exchange in the 1960s and that investment in both industries should be encouraged, whatever its provenance. These attitudes were unacceptable to more radical nationalists in the wider Malay world, especially President Sukarno, whose policy of confronting the new Malaysian Federation when it was formed in 1963 was based on a fear that it was simply a front for the neocolonial ambitions of Britain and the other former colonial powers in the region.
In the 1950s, the government of what was still British Malaya had to be urged by international development agencies to assume more responsibility for encouraging manufacturing industry. The report by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (as the World Bank was then known), published in 1955, recommended a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, the government should provide infrastructure including water, electric power, roads, and so on, while, on the other hand, it should "foster individual enterprise" through measures such as provision of technical and market research for secondary industry, investment in appropriate education and training programs, support for foreign investors in sectors where their technical knowhow could be crucial, and also the judicious use of tariff protection. On this last point, the report stressed that the tariff should be used as a means of encouraging development and not as a way of supporting "hopelessly highcost industries" (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1955: 123) . Here the bank seemed to be echoing the belief, strongly held by many British colonial offi cials, that most infant industries never grew up and that most colonies should remain primary producers (Meredith 1975: 497) .
Tariff protection was an especially diffi cult issue because those parts of British Malaya that had developed as free ports, especially Singapore and Penang, were fearful that with independence their free port status would be removed and their consumers forced to pay high tariffs on imported goods or buy high-cost manufactures from other parts of Malaya. These fears were part of the reason for Singapore's departure from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. But the Malay political elites who dominated policy making just before independence were themselves ambivalent about encouraging rapid industrialization because they knew that it would be the Chinese who would seize the opportunities provided by tariff protection. Some were also concerned about the impact of industrial protection on the urban-rural terms of trade and about the welfare effects on small rural producers, the great majority of whom were Malay. As Golay has argued, the insecurity felt by the Malay leadership also caused them to accept and even encourage the continuing large Western stake in the economy (1969a: 346).
The situation in the Philippines was different again. By the late 1930s, almost 45 percent of the assets of nonagricultural enterprises in the Philippines were owned by Filipino citizens (Golay 1969b: table 1). This was a far higher proportion than in any other colonial territory in East or Southeast Asia. Certainly many of the large owners of both agricultural estates and nonagricultural enterprises were of mixed Filipino and Chinese or Spanish descent, but the ethnicity issue was less politically fraught in the Philippines after 1945 than in many other parts of the region. This was mainly because ethnic Chinese were fewer in number than in many other parts of Southeast Asia and not really perceived as a major threat by postindependence governments. The most overtly anti-Chinese legislation was the Retail Trade Nationalization Law, enacted in 1954, which restricted retail trade to Filipino businesses after 1964. But many noncitizen Chinese who owned medium-and large-scale fi rms got around the legislation, usually by seeking naturalization (Yoshihara 1994: 28-32) . By the late 1960s, younger members of Chinese families were integrating reasonably well into the broader Philippine society.
A shared religion and a similar educational background helped in assimilating the Chinese in the Philippines; in addition, many in the governing elite had some Chinese and Spanish ancestry and harbored little resentment toward those of mixed or foreign blood if they were prepared to take citizenship and embrace Philippine cultural values. This lack of xenophobia was also refl ected in the attitudes of the government and business elites toward foreign and especially American companies. Most of the politicians who attained power after 1946 in the Philippines harbored little overt hostility to these enterprises. In addition, they had virtually no sympathy for socialist policies or even for government taking an activist role in the economy. As we have seen, land reform policies made little progress in the period from the late 1940s to the late 1960s. In the late 1950s, government expenditure relative to GDP was the lowest in the region (see Table 9 .6). By and large the political forces that had come to power in the last phase of the American period remained in control after 1946 and became over time an entrenched barrier to further structural transformation of the economy. In this sense, American colonialism was, as Kang has argued, "pervasive and yet, ultimately, nontransformative" (2002: 27) .
In the two decades after 1946, it could be argued, the lack of aggressive economic nationalism in the Philippines served the country well. There was substantial economic growth during this period. After the implementation of high levels of protection through extensive import and foreign exchange controls after 1949, the manufacturing sector grew rapidly, and by 1960 manufacturing accounted for a higher proportion of GDP than in any other former colonial territory in Asia (Golay 1969b: 33; see also Table 9 .4). Export growth slowed as a result of the overvaluation of the peso, and gradually the export sector was taken over by Philippine interests. It was these interests that ultimately pushed through the removal of exchange and import controls in 1962 and the substantial devaluation of the peso. It was much easier for the government of the day to undertake such measures once the export sector was seen to be in Philippine hands. At this point it might have appeared that pressures of indigenism, such as they were, were driving the Philippines in the direction of a more open and competitive economy. But in spite of these policy changes, it proved impossible for the Philippines to move into the kind of high-speed industrial growth achieved by Taiwan and South Korea after 1960. The benefi ts of the devaluation of 1962 were rapidly eroded by high infl ation (Power and Sicat 1971: 52), thus providing only a transitory boost to both existing and new export industries.
In both Taiwan and South Korea, forces of indigenism were weaker than in much of Southeast Asia, mainly because the dominant Japanese presence had left virtually no room for any other foreign participation in either econ-omy. There was no equivalent of the large migrant Indian or Chinese presence, and there was no foreign investment apart from that of the Japanese. Thus the abrupt departure of the colonial power in 1945 left large holes in both economies, which were fi lled in different ways in the two former colonies. In Taiwan, the Chen Yi administration that took over from the departing Japanese was imbued by the "statist economic ideas" used in KMT circles to interpret Sun Yat-sen's doctrine of fostering the people's livelihood (Lai, Myers, and Wei 1991: 84) . Offi cials were concerned with building up a patronage network for migrants from the mainland but were also imbued with an ideological bias in favor of a planned economy. Publicly owned fi rms soon controlled more than 70 percent of all industrial and agricultural enterprises. In addition, a new Monopoly Bureau controlled the supply and marketing of salt, camphor, opium, matches, liquor, and tobacco. The government also imposed strict regulations on private trade.
By the end of 1946, the Chen Yi administration probably controlled "even more economic activity than had the Japanese" (Lai, Myers, and Wei 1991: 87) . Even before the wave of refugees from the mainland in 1949, many mainlanders were employed in the bureaucracy, including the state enterprises. Steinhoff has estimated that the numbers of mainlanders employed by state enterprises more than doubled between 1946 and 1949; in 1949 they accounted for more than one-third of the total (1980: 61). Many lacked experience in the jobs they were allocated, and a process of rationalization of employment began in the early 1950s. Numbers of both mainlanders and Taiwanese working in the state enterprises fell. It is probable that some moved into private sector activities, although these were largely the province of indigenous Taiwanese. After the land reform was implemented, Taiwanese landlords received compensation for the land they had surrendered in the form of government bonds and stock in former Japanese companies; some of them at least used these assets to build up new enterprises (ibid.: 59).
Taiwanese and mainlanders did not meld easily into a unifi ed nation. They were in many cases divided by language; many indigenous Taiwanese had little command of Mandarin and were more fl uent in Japanese (Wade 1990: 232) . Few mainlanders who arrived in 1949 understood either Japanese or the local dialects. After the ruthless suppression of the 1947 uprising, there was little appetite on the part of the native Taiwanese for further political dissent. Rather they acquiesced in a division of labor that saw the mainland arrivals disproportionately represented in the civil service, the military, and key professions such as teaching. In this sense, the arrivals from the mainland replaced the Japanese, who had accounted for around half the government and professional jobs in the colonial era (see Table 6 .4). Indigenous Taiwanese found it easier to move into industry and commerce, where they had, in spite of considerable discrimination, been able to make some headway under the Japanese. For example, Taiwan Plastic, which grew into a vast conglomerate after 1960, was founded by a businessman who began as a rice trader in the Japanese era (Kobayashi 1996: 331) . By the mid-1970s, more than 70 percent of the three hundred largest companies in Taiwan were controlled by native Taiwanese (Wade 1990: 262) .
In a divided Korea, the situation was different again. In North Korea, the adoption of a strict socialist model led to the elimination of most forms of private enterprise by the end of the 1950s. In South Korea, most scholars have viewed the postarmistice years as characterized by rampant cronyism, where Japanese properties and aid dollars, largely from the United States, were distributed to business groups friendly to the Rhee regime at very low prices. It was thus possible for fi rms with the right connections to make "massive profi ts with no further effort than a bit of paper work in ordering imports" (Jones and Sakong 1980: 277) . In addition, businesses with good political and bureaucratic connections received low interest loans, tax benefi ts, and other privileges. This was a situation not unlike that which the Benteng program created in Indonesia, although in the Korean case large infl ows of foreign aid greatly added to the opportunities for rent seeking. Jones and Sakong have drawn a parallel between the charismatic political talents of Rhee and those of Sukarno, and argued that both were better suited to the creation and integration of a new nation than the development of an existing one (ibid.: 41).
Jones and Sakong point out that this situation changed with the advent of the Park government (1980: 276) . Under Park, fi rms were expected to make a convincing argument that the privileges conferred on them would be used productively. Good connections with the bureaucracy were still important, but as the supply of potential entrepreneurs increased, an element of competition was introduced into the process of securing the necessary governmentcontrolled inputs. At least some Koreans who had moved into business in the latter part of the colonial era or in the immediate aftermath of the Pacifi c War found that the business climate under Park allowed them to develop their business ventures without the impediments that hampered them under previous regimes. The introduction of a more open and competitive market for foreign exchange and a decline in aid fl ows eliminated an important cause of rent-seeking behavior. The Park government remained distrustful of foreign, and particularly Japanese, domination and did not encourage foreign fi rms to establish businesses in Korea. The absence of multinational companies in manufacturing, trade, and commerce created more space for indigenous fi rms. In this respect, Korea differed from Taiwan and even more from Southeast Asia after 1960.
It is striking how many of the policy debates in the former colonial territories in the decade after 1945 revolved around issues of ownership of productive assets (foreign or local, state or private, indigenous or migrant Asian). But it was clear, at least to the more thoughtful nationalists, that whatever their ultimate ownership, if assets were to be properly managed, it would be necessary to develop a domestic class of professional managers and technically trained workers. Throughout the region, whether in the former Japanese colonies or in Southeast Asia, colonial educational legacies especially at the tertiary level were at best modest and at worst nonexistent. It might have been true, as Jones and Sakong have argued in the Korean case, that potential managers and technicians might have learned by watching rather than by doing in the Japanese factories established in the late colonial era (1980: 18) . But such knowledge as the indigenous workers picked up was rapidly dissipated, not just in Korea but in other former colonies as well, through the disturbed years of the 1940s and 1950s. What was required was a dramatically increased supply of workers with the kinds of technical skills that modern industry and commerce demanded in the second part of the twentieth century.
The main exception to the shortage of skilled workers was the Philippines, where, in the mid-1950s, numbers of graduates in science and technology per 100,000 people were roughly the same as in Japan and substantially higher than elsewhere in Asia (Table 9 .11). This was the result of the high secondary and tertiary enrollments there in the late colonial era. But in Taiwan and South Korea, gross enrollment ratios at the primary level (numbers of children enrolled as a percentage of total numbers in the seven to twelve age groups) had already caught up with the Philippines by the mid-1950s, and in South Korea gross enrollment ratios at the secondary level were higher (Table  9 .11). The growth in educational enrollments in South Korea from the 1950s onward meant that, by the 1970s, almost half the male labor force had at least secondary education (Booth 2003b: 153) .
Even in economies such as South Korea and Taiwan where, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the nonagricultural sectors of the economy were growing rapidly, it was not always easy to match the output of the educational system with the requirements of the labor market. A labor force survey carried out in South Korea in 1974 found that, although open unemployment was only around 6.5 percent, a further 13 percent of workers were "underutilized" in the sense that there was a mismatch between their qualifi cations and the work they were doing. In the Philippines, where growth was slower during the 1960s, a 1968 survey found that around 10 percent of employed workers were underutilized using the mismatch criterion. Many were also working quite short hours (Hauser 1977: table 5) . While rapid expansion of access to education for the indigenous population was viewed by many postindependence politicians as one means of eradicating the legacy of the plural economy, fi nding productive jobs for the output of the education system proved more diffi cult than many had realized.
